「林訴美案」二月五日上訴法庭口頭辯論全譯

Feb5 Appeals Court Transcript
二月五日上訴庭文件
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譯者:謝鎮寬

美國哥倫比亞區上訴巡迴法院

林志昇等 ,上訴人,

美利堅合眾國,被上訴人。

第08-5078 號
星期四, 2009年2月5日
華盛頓特哥倫比亞特區

上述主題進行口頭辯論
根據通知。
庭前:
巡迴法官韓德森,布朗和葛費斯

出庭:
代表上訴人:
查爾斯坎普。
代表被上訴人:
梅利莎帕特森。 (司法部)

口頭辯論雙方代表:
查爾斯坎普。
代表上訴人
梅利莎帕特森。 (司法部)
代表被上訴人



法律程序

秘書:案件編號08-5078 ,林志昇等上訴人控訴美利堅合眾國。坎普先生代表上訴人, 帕特森女士代表被上訴人。

法院:坎普先生,早安。

坎普:早安。請求法院,我查爾斯坎普代表原告,這是一個條約解釋案。我們要求地方法院解釋舊金山和平條約並決定原告是否有任何美國憲法所賦予的權利。


法院:這就是之前所爭論的問題,是不是,無論是條約的解釋案件或其他案件。您不是指稱美國在行使某種形式的對台灣主權,難道這不是您控訴的論點?


坎普:法院應該審查主權,但不用決定主權。例如,在布邁丁案,他們看的是事實,最高法院審視事實,即古巴執行-

法院:你的意思是在布邁丁案,對不起。

坎普:是-

法院:好。

坎普:最高法院審查一個事實,即古巴擁有最終主權-這是他們的話--關塔那摩灣,但美國執行完全控制,所以他們審查主權,來決定在關塔那摩灣人應有什麼樣的憲法權利。


法院:您所理論的是指,美國對台灣行使主權。

坎普:在這本舊金山和平條約,它說,美國是台灣的主要佔領勢力。所以接下來的問題是根據憲法,我的客戶有什麼樣的權利,如果有的話。

法院:他們沒有權利,除非美國對台灣行使主權,對嗎?


坎普:他們應該審查主權,但不必決定主權。

法院:你的客戶可有任何權利,如果美國對台灣沒有主權?

坎普:如果美國不是主要佔領者-

法院:我使用的字眼是主權,這是這個字眼。回答我的問題。

坎普:主權。

法院:如果美國沒有執行對台灣的主權,那您的客戶可有任何要求,任何權利?

坎普:如果他們控制它。例如,在古巴的關塔那摩灣美國控制關塔那摩灣。我不知道這是意味著他們擁有主權或沒有,但他們控制它,他們在本質上,我認為這是事實上的主權,因為它們控制。而控制---

法院:所以美國也控制台灣?

坎普:他們沒有控制它。我們的立場是,依據法律在舊金山和平條約他們有法理上的主權(拼音藻。 ),因為它們是主要佔領者。

法院:哪個政府部門憲法賦予權力來決定誰有主權---


坎普:沒有決定主權的必要。這一事實-

法院:你剛才說他們有法理上的主權。

坎普:是的,那就是-

法院:哪個政府部門可以決定誰對土地擁有主權?


坎普:條約規定美國與台灣有關係。這在數年前已被決定為一個政治議題。

法院:這不是我的問題。我要求更普遍的原則,在法律的原則上,我們必須決定這起案件。是由那一個政府部門來決定,誰對一塊土地擁有法理主權?

坎普:嗯,這是由政治部門來決定誰擁有主權。但我們不是要求主權的定奪,而是一個主權的審查。

法院:我問的是原則問題。我們來看您的案子。

坎普:好。

法院:但它是由政治部門來決定誰擁有一塊土地的法理主權,對不對?

坎普:沒錯它早已被決定,而條約才是我們的立場。

法院:是的,我明白那是你的立場,但它是由政治部門來決定誰擁有法理主權,對不對?而你說該條約在這裡-

坎普:這是已經決定了,是的,正確。所以因此,問題是它是由法庭來決定-因為美國是台灣的主要佔領者,因此,要由法院來確定在那裡生活的人,在憲法下享有什麼樣的權利。法院決定依什麼樣的法律。法院決定-

法院:在紅卷內第三頁,政府說,“ 1954年美國與中華民國簽署了一項共同防禦條約,其中美國承認中華民國是代表中國的政府,並承認台灣是其領土。”這是準確的嗎?

坎普:不,那是不準確的。

法院:這不是?有什麼不對嗎?

坎普:那是為了一個非常有限的目的存在。共同防禦條約的立法始末已在我的答覆中引述,簡要地說共同防禦條約並沒有變更誰擁有台灣的主權。中華民國只是監管台灣。

法院:但是,美國承認中華民國管轄台灣。

坎普:中華民國只是行政監管它。那是在立法史上所明確指出地。這是一個行政監督台灣,由中華民國來執行。

法院:請問中華民國是否簽發護照給她的公民?

坎普:她是發行護照,但是那些有許多地方都不承認,因為有很多地方不-


法院:中華民國本身發行護照給她的公民。

坎普:這是我所了解的。

法院:是否有任何護照由台灣政府所簽發?我知道這個案件涉及原告尋求美國護照。

坎普:是的,他們就像非美國公民護照。

法院:什麼樣的證明文件或他們現在憑什麼旅行?

坎普:他們取得旅行證件,但它不被許多國家承認,因為這些國家不承認台灣。這是一個自由裁量的問題。那正是台灣人民的問題所在,他們不能去不承認他們旅行證件的國家。這就像拿了一本馬里蘭州簽發的護照,你知道,他們讓人覺得莫名其妙?這不是一個國家。

法院:難道是台灣的政府發行這些旅行證件?

坎普:是的。

法院:好。

法院:假設你是對的,您同意政治部門決定主權這個問題的,而您認為這是舊金山條約對我們的約束。


坎普:是的。

法院:但政治部門也有其他動作,即行政系統明確地採取模糊策略。法院可以輕率地不理會那些後來採取的行動?

坎普:這些後來採取的行動沒有一項改變了該條約。也沒有任何後續修改的條約。它被停留在,當他們在簽署舊金山和平條約及附錄或有關文件的談判時,就故意留下作為一個開放的議題,是誰擁有台灣。這非常清楚地表明,它被擱置開放保留未解的原因,是他們想要取決於日後在台灣發生的變化。在日本的盟軍並沒有達成任何協議,決定由誰來獲取台灣。而這個問題仍然懸置未解,行政部門也無法對條約做任何修改。現在該條約是最高法律-

法院:在您的回答中,您不是也剛剛承認政府的立場是,是不論誰對台灣擁有主權,它不是美國。這是一個開放的議題,也是行政部門50多年來的政策。

坎普:不,但從法律的觀點,我們是主要佔領勢力,這就是今天的法理地位。從這權利流程,那正是讓法庭來決定由這個法理地位,應該導向什麼樣的權利流程。美國是居於主要佔領勢力的地位。

法院:你能否舉個例給我,在歷史上美國是一塊領土的主要佔領權者,而該領土上的居民有權獲得美國護照或其他權利。

坎普:是的,菲律賓就是一個例子。事實上,當我們在菲律賓是主要佔領勢力時,就是一個重點。在第二次世界大戰後,同樣的情況,人民,對不起,我是說菲律賓人民有權獲得美國護照,它也早已被確認。所以他們獲得護照,然後維持一段時間,到當我們把菲律賓主權轉交給它的人民,它的政府。在新政府核發放護照前,也曾耽擱一段時間。在這段時間,我們仍在那裡,政府也正式運作,但你卻無法取得護照,那裡就有人一路告到最高法院,說人民無法取得提護照真是太殘酷和不尋常的懲罰,最高法院同意他們的指控。人民無人過問、沒有護照權利,他們說-

法院:但這情況並不曾發生在台灣人民身上。

坎普:不,這個問題從沒在台灣出現。

法院:是否有任何人在台灣嘗試過?

坎普:沒有,沒有。

法院:讓我針對你的客戶是非公民國民的要求來問你。這是要仰仗主權的確定或是另外您所持的論述基礎?

坎普:他們是否是國民,首先,這是一個法院才能決定的問題。移民法規明確指出,關於國籍的決定是由法庭來決定。而法院將依據人民所居住的領地與美國的關係來做決定。您審查這個關係,就如同在關塔那摩灣的案子一樣,他們審查美國所控制的,關塔那摩灣和這裡之間的關係。接著他們研究這個關係,然後決定有什麼權利。同樣的情形,您先檢查現有的關係,從過去多年來已存在於美國和台灣,然後從那裡你決定什麼樣的流程已經衍生,什麼樣的權利已經產生,非公民國籍是我們追尋的事項。

法院:我想我的具體問題是,你把重點放在永久效忠美國而通常被法院拒絕或你有不同的論點?


坎普:是的,這是由法院來決定,只有一點,這是法院來決定是否有此永久效忠。這是司法判決,而不是行政或政治決定。你必須關注,是的,什麼是法律關係?在舊金山和平條約的規範下,美國和台灣之間的關係是什麼,然後從那裡由您決定他們有什麼樣的權利。他們是國民,或不是?但是,這是一個實質性問題,你知道,我們基本上寄希望於法庭上。你知道,我們並不認為這是一個政治問題案件,我們仰仗法庭。這很明顯地我們為什麼提出上訴。我們並不認為政治問題的原則適用。這裡沒有一個單一的個案,政府引據,說,政治問題原則禁止法院解釋條約或決確定已存在的憲法權利。事實上,政府本身的簡報說,在我們的簡報中,所有我們引述的案子,在申訴狀中所提的都與它相反,因為所有的案件涉及,司法解釋法規或條約。那是正確的。我們所有案件都涉及解釋法規或條約,和裁決憲法的權利。

法院:所以您是不認為布邁丁真正擺脫政治問題的理論。你只是認為它並不適用於這種情況。


坎普:我認為,在那個案子,法院著眼於美國和關塔那摩灣之間的關係。他們審查了主權,基本上是控制。過去的情況如何?1901 年唐尼斯訴比德威爾案,最高法院說,要確定有哪些憲法具體規定,是適用於所有案件,涉及調查該領土與美國的關係。這正是關塔那摩灣案、布邁丁案件所以憑賴者。你知道,你是可以檢驗這層關係的。

法院:現在你認識到,我們因不願意追隨著布邁丁案,所以我們沒有獲得很多溫暖的絨毛。

坎普:知道了,我-

法院:但是,我們是追隨者。

坎普:是的,但是,所以我沒有要求--我們沒有要求決定主權。我們只要求您檢查這個情況所涉及與布邁丁案件及1901年的唐尼斯訴-

法院:如果我們發現,後來行政部門的行動多少修改了舊金山和約,你的案子真的開啟,舊金山和平條約今日已被錯誤管轄,對不對?

坎普:正確,如果舊金山和平條約目前不存在,那麼我們就沒戲唱了。但是,條約是該土地的最高法典不得更動,除非另立條約,或者我們可以撤回。

法院:你不認為行政部門所採行的條約立場,與你相反?


坎普:沒有,沒有。

法院:行政部門所採取的立場是,美國並不擁有主權或控制台灣。

坎普:它實際上沒有這樣做。它基本上是說我們也沒有改變-

法院:這真是要讓國務院吃驚,說他們沒有這麼做。

坎普:不,他們從來沒有說,我們已不再是台灣主要佔領勢力。我的意思是,他們從來沒有,如果他們有具體意願說,我們已不再是台灣的主要佔領勢力,他們可從未使用過這些字眼。從來沒有任何文件,指出行政或立法部門說過,我們已不再是台灣的主要佔領勢力,行政部門或國會也還沒有決定說台灣人不是國民。就是這個領域還沒有決定。

法院:讓我來問你有關台北條約,它至少是中華民國和日本之間的條約,中華民國說第10條指出,台灣及澎湖的居民和前居民都是中華民國的國民。現在如果我們說好,他們是美國公民,那我們該如何處理該條約呢?我的意思是我們應給該條約什麼樣的份量,來給中華民國及其他我不 知道的地方交代,因而他們都宣稱台灣人民是中華民國的國民?

坎普:嗯,我會承認我從沒有讀過這些在條例中的字眼,說台灣人民是國民。那指他們是中華民國的國民,是被同意。

法院:好,在第10條它是說,中華民國國民應包括所有台灣、福爾摩沙和澎湖、澎湖群島的居民和前居民及和他們的後裔。

坎普:這並沒有改變我們的條約,說我們是台灣的主要佔領勢力。

法院:那麼它可能沒有改變該條約,但我們-

坎普:我認為這將是,坦率地說,我認為這將是一個政治裁決,來決定該條約對我們政府有什麼樣影響。但是,我想法院只負責解釋條約,所以你可以說,無論採用哪種方式。但我不知道-

法院:讓我問你,如果我理解你的論點,你靠的就是條約中的一句話,主要佔領權國,美國是主要佔領權國。

坎普:正確。

法院:你是說從那句話導引出給台灣公民的權利。這些權利有什麼限制?所以,他們就可以獲得美國憲法賦予公民的所有權利?

坎普:嗯有,回朔到世紀交替時的列島案例,1900年已經處理什麼樣權利適用的問題。事實上,正如我在這裡所準備的--這個問題已在唐尼斯訴比德威爾案陳述,再次,它說,要確定有關憲法特別規定的適用涉及調查,可以吧。真正列島案件的問題,不在於是否把憲法擴及菲律賓或波多黎各--你曾要求其他例子,菲律賓--當我們去那裡,但是它的條款都適用。

法院:那麼現在您要求護照的權利,對不對?但你申訴的強制力,要求人身保護令延長?我的意思是你已經在談論布邁丁案件。

坎普:嗯,我想,我的意思是說,這些案件只強調憲法宣布的個人基本權利。這就是這些案件所支持的。這是托雷斯訴波多黎各和-

法院:這是案件所支持-

坎普:基本的-

法院:在你的申訴中,那麼那些基本權利,美國憲法的權利,台灣公民應該享有?你說獲得護照,只是其中之一。

坎普:當然,在聲明中,那是我在投訴中所追求的。頭兩個聲明,都與他們所要求的非公民國民身份有關。那些他們在第五修正案權利對生命,自由和財產沒有受到的正當法律程序。第十四修正案,同樣的事情。第五修正案,旅行權利沒有受到法律正當程序,必須受到通知和進行聽證會,換句話說,獲得護照的權利。最高法院所掌握的是,你知道,它是殘酷和不尋常的懲罰,不允許別人有護照。

法院:你的論點是從舊金山和平條約開始,台灣的公民就應享有這些-

坎普:在憲法下個人的基本權利,正確,以及第八,第十四和第一修正案請願權向政府請求平反。所以,但這些都是實質性問題。

法院:因此,台灣的公民他們根據第一修正案提出抱怨,他們抱怨誰?他們是針對對中華民國或他們針對--

坎普:不-

法院: -美國-

坎普:美國,美國。如果他們有基本權利-

法院:因此,所有現在台灣的政府行為者都是美國的代理人?

坎普:中華民國基本上只是被信託掌管台灣。

法院:米蘭達權利,所以我是台灣公民,我被逮捕,而逮捕的公權力,卻不宣讀我的米蘭達權利,我現在要到聯邦地區法院-

坎普:我們也沒有要求這一點。我們也沒有要求這一點。這只是基本權利而這意味著-

法院:陪審團審判?

坎普:我們要求的不是這一點。我們要求的不是這一點。我的意思是-

法院:我想了解主導你的力量-

坎普:當然,我的意思是這是一個實質性問題,正確地說就是權利-

法院:這是令人吃驚的,你所要求是相當令人吃驚的。

坎普:嗯,也許是,但,這就是法律所支持的,這是事實所支持的。而法院是那些負責確定哪些憲法權利存在,我們寄希望於法院有一天,法院能確定有那些憲法的權利存在。

法院:好吧,謝謝你。

坎普:非常感謝你。

法院:謝謝你。


法院: 帕特森女士。

帕特森:請求法院,梅利莎帕特森代表美國。庭上,我們要求法院確認地方法院駁回的行動,理由是為了解決美國對台灣的法理主權,它將涉及政治問題,或者是如果本法院逐字在這裡分析投訴,只斷言原告根據美國的移民和國籍法成為國民。我認為,那可以很輕易地就案情的法定理由來揭露,一個國民在法律範圍內的定義,是出生在美國外圍屬地者,僅限於美國,薩摩亞和斯溫斯島。



法院:什麼是政府就有關舊金山和平條約地位的的立場,特別是,美國是主要佔領權國的用語?這是條好的法律?


帕特森:我認為這項條約是有效的。我們還沒有採取的立場,是否美國是,事實上,主要的佔領者,對不起,美國還沒有-我要明確指出。美國並非台灣的主要佔領權國。

法院:已經改變了嗎,因為這是該條約的用語,對嗎?

帕特森:是的,但我認為有一些相關的變化,如果這個法院是著眼於法理主權。首先,在1954年共同防禦條約中,美國承認台灣是中華民國 的領土。在1972年,我們開始與中華人民共和國對談。 1978年,卡特總統宣布,截至1979年1月1日,我們中止與中華民國外交關係,而與中華人民共和國建交。

法院:但它為何與主要佔領國的用語不合?也許1954年共同防禦條約是承認一個政府,叫中華民國。


帕特森:當然,庭上。

法院:是否有任何其他的例子,或者那已足夠了?

帕特森:我認為那是足夠了,庭上。再次,我們沒有提供給舊金山和平條約一個解釋,因為我們不認為這是與此有關。原告控訴的是,舊金山和平條約使美國成為主要佔領國,然後,他們採取跳躍式的推理說,這意味著美國是法理主權者,然後再一個跳躍,以法理主權說他們是國民。

法院:那句話究竟意何所指?我意思是它代表某種含意。

帕特森:主要佔領國?

法院:對,沒錯。

帕特森:我認為,是指在當時美國簽署該條約,它是日本的主要佔領權國。我有些猶豫,來提供一個明確的,美國的最終確立該條約,因為再次,我們就是不認為這是與此有關。原告聲稱他們的權利,追循的不是單純地根據該條約,而是從一個事實,即該條約使美國成為台灣法理上的主權者。而美國已經非常,非常清楚地表明,無論誰是台灣法理上的主權者,它不會是美國。此外,所有原告訴求的依據-

法院:如果,事實上,該條約,條約的用語,創造了美國是法理上的主權者,美國有退路來退出這一條約嗎?我不認為他們可以。

帕特森:當然,庭上,我認為任何爭論,誰是一個領土的法理主權者,是完全在由的政治部門來定奪。


法院:如果一項條約規定,美國是法理上的主權-

帕特森:我認為-

法院: -行政部門可以單方面改變嗎?

帕特森:我有點動搖。我在思考高華德訴卡特案,但我認為總統可以-

法院:讓我來幫你,答案是否定的。

帕特森:好吧,但我不相信該條約有什麼,可以確立美國是法理主權者,我認為,要構成這個境界,需要看該條約在這裡,法院的聲明是如何來審視政治議題。而這個法院在Vanquil (拼音藻。 )的明確判決和引用貝克說,你需要-

法院:這裡所不同的是,該條約的語言是否支持律師妳所說。如果,事實上,主要佔領權國的用語言是指,美國是在法理上的主權國,妳就麻煩了。

帕特森:嗯-

法院:妳遇到麻煩了。

帕特森:讓我來提供美國的立場,這不是該條約的旨意。這可能意味著,這並不指美國是台灣法理上的主權者,我認為要解決這一問題,本法院應履行判別分析,在這裡特別提出的問題。而這特別在這裡提出的問題不是,美國是否應該是主要佔領權國,而是原告的美國國民訴求,進一步與否,指美國是台灣在法理上的主權者,而就這兩個問題,原告的訴求注定要失敗。

法院:如果美國是台灣法理上的主權者,他們將是國民?

帕特森:不必然,庭上。

法院:好,因此有可能,這些問題實際上是分開的。


帕特森:是的,庭上。當我們-

法院:這是為什麼?我不-

帕特森:由於國民是一個由移民國籍法,來界定的法定名詞。

法院:美國,薩摩亞和史懷恩群島-

帕特森:正是,庭上。而我猜想原告聲稱,有一些非法定途徑的國民身份,我認為有相當堅實先例牆,所有8個巡迴法庭,以審查你是否可以經由任何非法定路線,成為一個移民法所規範的國民。他們明確告訴您不能。

法院:但是什麼權利-

法院:在布邁丁案後仍然成立嗎?

帕特森:我-

法院:我的意思是我想坎普先生主張,事實上的主權是否足夠,然後如果他們有法理主權的訴求,他們將實際上處於更有利的地位。

帕特森:我認為,這根本就不真實,庭上。所有的案件,布邁丁和列島案例,最高法院明確表示,他們所審查的是美國涉及控制的程度,或許是事實主權。而布邁丁案判決明確指出相同的用語,地方法院在這裡指出從Vamiliar布朗(拼音藻。 )他們拒絕質疑政府的說法,美國是不是關塔那摩灣的法理主權者,正如本法院應當拒絕有關行政論斷的問題,即美國不是台灣法理上的主權者。因此,在這裡所有的原告訴求,都停留在法理主權的主張。他們提不出也無法斷言,美國行使任何對台灣實質控制。


法院:但這不正好將我們引導至一個奇怪的結果,事實主權是比法理主權更強有力,如果,那是在這裡存在的話?

帕特森:這可能是奇數,但這是最高法院所說,實際上我覺得有很好的理由,庭上。在列島案件,或至少在布邁丁判決討論到列島案件中,法院說,這個問題,對某一特定領土的法理主權,你也知道,不必然就扯上憲法。這是這裡所提的限制,美國實際對人民行使權力,憲法的限制,尾隨而來是反抗紙上審判的實際權力行使。

法院:一個居住在美國行使法理主權領土上的人,他不能符合法定要求成為一個國民,享有什麼權利?

帕特森:我不知道,這個問題是否被提出過,因為我並不認為,過去曾有過任何探討,如果美國只是擁有法理上主權,但不行使任何實際控制。我不知道在那裡我們有什麼權利。

法院: -可是你知道在事實主權上,我只是想知道除了國民這個法定權利,您說排除,是否還有任何其他權利?


帕特森:如果美國行使,我認為你的問題是,事實上的?


法院:是的。

帕特森:是的,我認為在列島案例已討論到可能的多項權利,如果加美國依其目標的程度行使實際權力或控制。而法院指出,這是一個非常特定類型的案件分析,取決於美國的特殊關係。我認為,在一些列島案件中,法院指出愈強的連結,美國就愈控制該地區。當去執行權力的時候,它可能會改變憲法權限的形態。因此,我不能為您提供一張一般洗衣清單式的權利,它可能是連同行使事實主權一起運作。


法院:因此,他們不包括有護照權。

帕特森:我不認為他們會包括護照的權利,當然,庭上。如果法院沒有其他問題,政府將休息。


法院:其實我有一個問題。

帕特森:是的。

法院:這是一個小點。在您紅色簡報中第18 ,您引述我們在布邁丁案的判決, “確定一個地區的主權是立法和行政的要求。 ”你是否同意這一說法,是由立法職能,來確定一個地區的主權?我認為政府的立場應是,由行政部門的專權決定。憲法賦予的行政權,來承認大使(暗) 。

帕特森:嗯當然,第2條充分說明行政部門的代表。只要立法權在這裡參一腳,我認為他們已經清楚地在這個案中談論過。我不知道是否每個案件將涉及立法權在特殊主權的重量。

法院:好的。你有兩分鐘的時間。

坎普:謝謝你。

法院:針對政府所說任何要點發言。

坎普:是的,只是非常,非常簡單。我只是想指出,在布邁丁案,它說,這是不是完全罕見的,一個國家的法理主權領土,實際被全權控制或主權由別人支配。這種情況可能會發生在類似,在西班牙美國戰爭中的關塔那摩,是戰爭期間所獲取的領土。所以,你知道,我們征服了日本。日本放棄所有權利,名份和索賠及領土包括台灣。我們是主要佔領勢力,因此,所以布邁丁案件涉及到法理主權,並指出,當然,列島案例至今仍然有效。很明顯,這表示百年的老理論,指明我們對目前問題的分析。有鑑於此,只要我們擁有一塊領土的主權,那裡就保證有憲法所頒布的某些基本個人權利。而,是的,政府 的律師指出,目前的這種六項貝克因素歧視性分析,必須克服,而地方法院卻沒有做到。她只是有點,你知道,她沒有 -

法院: -她確定了兩個貝克因素。

坎普:但是她-

法院:你只需要一個。

坎普:好吧,但我不認為她理解,而我不認為--我不認為她,她顯然不明白,我們不是在尋求宣示主權。我們正在尋求一項憲法所規定公告的權利,及由法院對條約所作的解釋。因此,法院只是有點下錯腳,然後如果您認為我們正在尋求由法院來決定誰擁有台灣,然後是政治行為問題的案子將適用,那她是對的。政府也對,但這卻不是我們所追求的。我們要求的不是法院來決定誰擁有台灣。我們要求法院依據條約的語言來判定,有哪些權利,憲法上的基本權利-

法院:因此您的論點是,該條約明確指出,美國是-

坎普:主要佔領勢力。

法院:它導引出權力,擁有一本護照的權利。

坎普:正確,正確的,正確的。而只有一個-

法院:與其他標誌的公民身份,受到了美國憲法的保護。

坎普:是的,某些基本權利有待定奪。而我只是想指出,如果可以的話,只有一個-


法院:可以。

坎普: -多幾分鐘,然而,無論是我的客戶應該永久效忠美國,來作為他們是否符合國民的判決目的,這是由聯邦法院來裁決的問題。國會中的移民法並沒有提供任何明確的指導,在何種情況下,一個人缺欠永久效忠美國,這是從第四巡迴案件( 2006 ) Draggient訴岡薩雷斯(拼音藻。 ) 。還有其他類似的案件。它是由法庭來決定國籍和由法院來確定永久效忠。而那裡並沒有說,你必須走入法規約定。我認為這是一個未決的問題。

法院:好的。

坎普:非常感謝你。

法院:謝謝你。傳喚下個案件..


數字簽名的證書

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卡洛琳G吉布森2009年2月8日
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
ROGER C.S. LIN, et al.,Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee.

No. 08-5078
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Washington, D.C.
The above-entitled matter came on for oral
argument pursuant to notice.
BEFORE:
CIRCUIT JUDGES HENDERSON, BROWN AND GRIFFITH
APPEARANCES:
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:
CHARLES H. CAMP, ESQ.
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE:
MELISSA PATTERSON, ESQ. (DOJ)
C O N T E N T S
ORAL ARGUMENT OF:
CHARLES H. CAMP, Esq.
On Behalf of the Appellants
MELISSA PATTERSON, Esq. (DOJ)
On Behalf of the Appellee

PROCEEDINGS
THE CLERK: Case number 08-5078, Roger C.S. Lin, et al., Appellants v. United States of America. Mr. Camp for the Appellants, Ms. Patterson for the Appellee.
THE COURT: Mr. Camp, Good morning.
MR. CAMP: Good morning. May it please the Court, I am Charles Camp on behalf of plaintiffs/appellants. This is a treaty interpretation case. We’re asking the District Court to interpret the San Francisco Peace Treaty and determine whether the plaintiffs have any rights under theU.S. Constitution.
THE COURT: That’s why the issue is before is, isn’t it, whether it’s a treaty interpretation case or some other case. Doesn’t your claim turn on whether the United States exercises some form of sovereignty over Taiwan, isn’t that the gravamen of your argument?
MR. CAMP: The Court would have to examine sovereignty, but not determine sovereignty. For example, in the Boumediene case, they looked at the fact, the Supreme Court looked at the fact that Cuba exercises -
THE COURT: You mean the Boumediene case, I’m sorry.
MR. CAMP: Yes -
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CAMP: The Supreme Court looked at the fact that Cuba has ultimate sovereignty --that was their words --Guantanamo Bay, but the U.S. exercises complete control and so they examined sovereignty to determine what constitutional rights the people at Guantanamo Bay have.
THE COURT: Your claim is that the United States exercises sovereignty over Taiwan.
MR. CAMP: Under this San Francisco Peace Treaty, it says that the United States is the principal occupying force over Taiwan. And so the question then is what rights, if any, do my clients have under the Constitution.
THE COURT: And they have no rights unless the United States exercises sovereignty over Taiwan, right?
MR. CAMP: They have to look at sovereignty, but they don’t determine sovereignty.
THE COURT: Do your clients have any rights if the United States has no sovereignty over Taiwan?
MR. CAMP: If the U.S. is not the principal occupier -
THE COURT: I’m using the word sovereignty, that’s the word. Answer my question.

MR. CAMP: Sovereignty.
THE COURT: If the United States exercises no sovereignty over Taiwan, do your clients have any claims, any rights?
MR. CAMP: If they control it. For example, in Cuba, in Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. controls Guantanamo Bay. I don’t know if that means they have sovereignty or not, but they control it and they have in essence, I would consider it to be de facto sovereignty because of their control. And the control---
THE COURT: So does the United States control Taiwan?
MR. CAMP: They don’t control it. Our position is they have sovereignty de jure (phonetic sp.) as a matter of law under the San Francisco Peace Treaty because they are the principal occupier.
THE COURT: Which branch of government does the Constitution give the power to determine who’s sovereign over a ---
MR. CAMP: There’s no determination of sovereignty that’s necessary. The fact -
THE COURT: You just said they have sovereignty de jure.
MR. CAMP: Yes, and that’s -
THE COURT: Which branch of government decides who has sovereignty de jure over land?
MR. CAMP: The U.S. has a relationship with Taiwan as set forth in the treaty. That’s been decided as a political matter years ago.
THE COURT: That’s not my question. I’m asking about more general principle, principles of law by which we have to decide this case. Which branch of government determines who has sovereignty de jure over a piece of land?
MR. CAMP: Well, it is for the political branches to determine who has sovereignty. But we’re not asking for a determination of sovereignty. There’s an examination of sovereignty.
THE COURT: I’m asking questions about principles. We’ll get to your case.
MR. CAMP: Okay.
THE COURT: But it is for the political branches to decide who has sovereignty de jure over a piece of land, right?
MR. CAMP: Well it’s already been determined and the treaty is our position.
THE COURT: Yes, I understand that’s your position, but it’s for the political branches to make the determination who has sovereignty de jure, right? And you say the treaty here -
MR. CAMP: It’s already been decided, yes, correct. And so therefore the question is it is for the courts to decide --well because the U.S. is the principal occupying force over Taiwan, it is therefore for the courts to determine what rights do people living there have under the Constitution. Courts decide what the laws are. Courts decide -
THE COURT: In the red brief in page 3, the Government says, “In 1954 the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty wherein the United States recognized the Republic of China as the Government of China and recognized Taiwan to be one of its territories.” Is that accurate?
MR. CAMP: No, that’s not accurate.
THE COURT: It’s not? What’s wrong with it?
MR. CAMP: That was for a very limited purpose there. The legislative history for the Mutual Defense Treaty which is cited in my reply brief makes clear that the Mutual Defense Treaty made no change whatsoever in who has sovereignty over Taiwan. The Republic of China oversees Taiwan.
THE COURT: But the United States recognized the Republic of China to govern Taiwan.
MR. CAMP: Well the Republic of China oversees it administratively. That’s what the legislative history makes clear. It is that it is an administrative overseeing of Taiwan that the Republic of China does.
THE COURT: Does the Republic of China issue passports to its citizens?
MR. CAMP: It issues passports, but those are not recognized by a lot of places because there are a lot of places don’t -

THE COURT: The Republic of China itself issues passports for its citizens.
MR. CAMP: That’s my understanding.
THE COURT: Is there any passport that’s issued by the Taiwanese Government? I know this case involves the plaintiffs seeking U.S. passports.
MR. CAMP: Yes, they were like non-U.S. citizen passports.
THE COURT: What type of identification or what do they travel on now?
MR. CAMP: They get a travel document, but it’s not recognized by countries that don’t recognize Taiwan. It’s a discretionary matter. That is the problem that the people from Taiwan have is they can’t go to countries that don’t recognize their travel documents. It’s like showing up with a passport issued by Maryland, you know, they just go well what’s this? This is not a country.
THE COURT: And does the Taiwanese Government issue these travel documents?
MR. CAMP: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE COURT: Assuming that you’re right, you agree that the political branches decide this question of sovereignty and you think that we did that in the Treaty of San Francisco.
MR. CAMP: Yes.
THE COURT: But there have been other actions by the political branches, namely the Executive, which have articulated this idea of strategic ambiguity. Can the Court simply ignore those later actions?
MR. CAMP: None of those later actions changed the treaty. And there have been no later treaties to amend. It was left, who owns Taiwan was left purposefully as an open question when they signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty included in the appendix or documents pertaining to the negotiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. And it’s very clear that it was left open because they wanted the option to decide what happened to Taiwan at a later time. There was no agreement that could be reached among the allied forces in Japan as to who gets Taiwan. And that question is still open and the Executive cannot issue something that modifies a treaty. Now the treaty is the supreme law of -
THE COURT: In your answer, haven’t you just acknowledged what the Government’s position here is, is that whoever has sovereignty over Taiwan, it isn’t the United States. It’s an open issue. That’s been the policy of the Executive for 50 years or so.
MR. CAMP: No, but as a matter of law, we are the principal occupying force, and that is the status as a matter of law today. And from that rights flow, and that is for the courts to decide what rights flow from that status. The status of the U.S. being the principal occupying force.
THE COURT: Can you cite me any examples in history where the United States has been the principal occupying force of a territory and the residents of that territory were entitled to passports from the United States or other rights.
MR. CAMP: Yes, the Philippines is one example. In fact, there was a point in time when we were the principal occupying force over the Philippines. After following World War II, the same situation, the people, I’m sorry, the people in the Philippines had rights to U.S. passports that had been recognized. So they had passports and then there was a time when we were turning over the sovereignty for the Philippines to its own people, to its own government. And there was a delay before the new government would issue passports. And so during that gap when we were there and the government became effective, you couldn’t get passports and somebody there went all the way to the Supreme Court and said it’s cruel and unusual punishment for people not to be able to get a passport and the Supreme Court agreed. The people in limbo had no rights to passports, and they said -
THE COURT: But that’s never been done for the people in Taiwan.
MR. CAMP: No, this issue has not come up on Taiwan before.
THE COURT: Has it ever been attempted by anyone in Taiwan before?
MR. CAMP: No, no.
THE COURT: Let me ask you about the claim that your clients are non-citizen nationals. Does that depend on this determination of sovereignty or is that a separate basis on which you are arguing?
MR. CAMP: Whether they are nationals, first of all, is a question for courts to decide. The immigration statute makes it clear that decisions on nationality are for the courts to decide. And the courts will decide on the basis of the relationship of the territory where the people live to the United States. You examine the relationship just like in the Guantanamo Bay case, they examined the relationship between the U.S. as control of Guantanamo Bay and here. And then they examined the relationship and then decided what the rights were. It’s the same thing. You examine the relationship that exists, that previously and has existed for years between the U.S. and Taiwan and then you decide from there what flows from that, what rights flow from that. And non-citizen nationality is one of the things that we are seeking.
THE COURT: I guess my specific question is are you focusing on this idea of permanent allegiance to the United States which courts have generally rejected or are you making a different argument?
MR. CAMP: Yes, it is for courts to decide, just one point. It is for courts to decide whether there’s this permanent allegiance. That’s a judicial decision and not an Executive or political decision. You have to look, yes, what is the legal relationship? What is the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan and that is set forth in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and then from that you decide what rights they have. Are they nationals or not? But that’s a substantive issue that, you know, we basically want our day in court on. You know, we don’t believe this is a political question case and we want our day in court. That’s obviously why we’re appealing. We don’t think the political question doctrine applies. There’s not a single case that the Government cites that says that the political question doctrine has ever prohibited a court from interpreting a treaty or determining the existence of constitutional rights. In fact, the Government’s own brief says that all the cases we have cited in our briefs, in the appellants’ briefs are in opposite it says because all the cases involve judicial interpretation of statutes or treaties. Well that’s precisely correct. All of our cases do involve the interpretation of a statute or a treaty and the determination of the constitutional rights.
THE COURT: So you are not arguing that Boumediene actually does away with the political question doctrine. You are just arguing that it doesn’t apply in this circumstance.
MR. CAMP: I’m arguing that in that case the courts looked at the relationship between the U.S. and Guantanamo Bay. They examined the sovereignty basically, the control. What was the situation? In Downes v. Bidwell in 1901, the Supreme Court said that the determination of what particular provision of the constitution is applicable in all cases involves an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relationship to the United States. And that was the case relied on in the Guantanamo Bay case and the Boumediene case. You know, you can examine the situation.
THE COURT: Now you realize that we are reluctant followers of Boumediene, so we don’t get a lot of warm fuzzies.
MR. CAMP: Okay, I -
THE COURT: But we are followers.
MR. CAMP: Yes, but, so I’m not asking --there’s no determination of sovereignty we’re asking for. We’re only asking that you examine the situation as was done in the Boumediene case and as was done in 1901, Downes v. -
THE COURT: If we were to find that later Executive action somehow altered the San Francisco Peace Treaty, your case really turns on San Francisco Peace Treaty being governed wrong today, right?
MR. CAMP: Correct, if the San Francisco Peace Treaty doesn’t exist in its current form, then we’re done. But the treaties are the supreme law of the land and can’t be changed except by another treaty, or we can withdraw.
THE COURT: Wouldn’t you acknowledge that the Executive has taken since the treaty positions that are contrary to yours?
MR. CAMP: No, no.
THE COURT: The Executive has taken the position that the United States does not have sovereignty or control over Taiwan.
MR. CAMP: It hasn’t actually done that. It has basically said we are not changing -

THE COURT: It’s a surprise to the State Department to hear they haven’t done that.
MR. CAMP: No, they have never said we are no longer the principal occupying force of Taiwan. I mean they have never been, if they had specifically intended to say we are no longer the principal occupying force of Taiwan, they have never used those words. There’s never any document that the Executive or the legislative branch has ever said we are no longer the principal occupying force of Taiwan and there have been no decisions by the Executive Branch or Congress that people in Taiwan are not nationals. This is just an area that hasn’t been decided.
THE COURT: Let me ask you about the Treaty of Taipei which was between the Republic of China and Japan and at least in that treaty, the Republic of China said in Article 10 that the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan and the Pescadors (phonetics sp.) are nationals of the Republic of China. Now what do we do about that treaty if we say well, they are U.S. nationals as well? I mean what weight do we give that treaty where the Republic of China has and probably in other places too, I don’t know, but declared the people of Taiwan to be nationals of the Republic of China?
MR. CAMP: Well, I’ll admit I have not ever read those words in that treaty that indicate that the people of Taiwan are nationals. That it’s agreed that they are nationals of the Republic of China.
THE COURT: Well what it says in Article 10 is nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan, Formosa and Penhu, the Pescadors and their descendants.
MR. CAMP: That doesn’t change our treaty that says that we are the principal occupying force of Taiwan.
THE COURT: Well it may not change the treaty but what do we -
MR. CAMP: I think that would be, frankly, I think that would be a political decision to decide what effect does that treaty have on our Government. But, I guess courts are only charged with interpreting treaties so you can argue that either way. But I am unaware -
THE COURT: Let me ask you, if I understand your arguments, you’re relying on a phrase in the treaty, principal occupying power, right, United States is principal occupying power.
MR. CAMP: Correct.
THE COURT: You’re saying that from that language flows rights to citizens of Taiwan. What are the limits of those rights? So they receive all the constitutional rights of a citizen of the United States?
MR. CAMP: Well there are, the Insular Cases back from the turn of the century, 1900 dealt with the issue of what rights apply. In fact, in that case --I’ve got it right here --the question was in Downes v. Bidwell again, it says the determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable involves an inquiry, okay. The real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Puerto Rico --you had asked for other examples, the Philippines --when we went there but which of its provisions were applicable.
THE COURT: Well right now you’re asking for passport rights, right? But on the force of your reasoning, habeas corpus extend that? I mean you’ve been talking about the Boumediene case.
MR. CAMP: Well, I would, I mean the cases say fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution. That’s what the cases support. That’s Torres v. Puerto Rico and the -
THE COURT: That’s what the case supports -
MR. CAMP: Fundamental -
THE COURT: So what’s some of the fundamental rights, American constitutional rights that citizens of Taiwan are entitled to under your reasoning? You’re saying get a passport, that’s one of them.
MR. CAMP: Sure, well it’s in the declarations that I sought which are in the complaint. The first two declarations have to do with requiring that they are noncitizen nationals. The ones that they are the Fifth Amendment Right against life, liberty and property without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment, same thing. The Fifth Amendment, right to travel without due process of law which requires notice and hearing, in other words, right to a passport. The Supreme Court held that it’s, you know, it’s cruel and unusual punishment to not allow somebody to have a passport.
THE COURT: And your argument is ever since the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the citizens of Taiwan have been entitled to these -
MR. CAMP: Fundamental personal rights under the Constitution, correct, as well as the Eighth, Fourteenth and the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress. So, but those are substantive questions.
THE COURT: So citizens of Taiwan who complain under the First Amendment, who do they bring that against? Do they bring that against the Republic of China or they bring that against -
MR. CAMP: No -
THE COURT: --the United States -
MR. CAMP: The United States, the United States. If they have fundamental rights -
THE COURT: So all the government actors in Taiwan right now are agents of the United States?
MR. CAMP: The Republic of China is holding Taiwan basically in trust.
THE COURT: Miranda rights, so I’m a citizen of Taiwan and I’m arrested and the arresting authority doesn’t read me my Miranda rights, I now come to federal district court -
MR. CAMP: We haven’t asked for that. We haven’t asked for that. It’s just fundamental rights and what that means is -
THE COURT: Jury trial?
MR. CAMP: We’re not asking for that. We’re not asking for that. I mean it’s -

THE COURT: I’m trying to understand the force to get to your -

MR. CAMP: Sure, I mean that’s a substantive question in terms of precisely what rights -
THE COURT: It’s breathtaking what you’re asking for is quite breathtaking.
MR. CAMP: Well, it might be, but that’s what the law supports and that’s what the facts support. And courts are the ones charged with determining what constitutional rights exist and we’d like our day in court to have the court determine what constitutional rights exist.
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
MR. CAMP: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Patterson.
MS. PATTERSON: May it please the Court, Melissa Patterson on behalf of the United States.Your Honors, we ask this Court to affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the action here either on the grounds that in order to resolve the United States de jure sovereignty over Taiwan would involve a political question or if this Court construes the complaint here to only assert that plaintiffs are nationals under the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I think that can be exposed just simply on the merits on the statutory grounds to be a national is defined within that act as persons born in the outlying possessions of the United States which are limited to America, Samoa and Swains Island.
THE COURT: What is the Government’s position about status of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, particularly the language that United States is the principal occupying power? Is that good law?
MS. PATTERSON: I believe the treaty is in effect. We have not taken a position on whether or not the United States is, in fact, the principal occupying, I’m sorry, the United States has not --let me be clear. The United States is not the principal occupying power over Taiwan.
THE COURT: What has changed, because that’s the language of the treaty, right?
MS. PATTERSON: Yes, but I think there have been several pertinent changes if this Court is looking at de jure sovereignty. First of all, there was the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty in which the United States recognized Taiwan to be among the Republic of China’s territories. In 1972 we began talks with the People’s Republic of China. In 1978, President Carter announced that as of January 1, 1979 we would be discontinuing diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and opening up relations with the People’s Republic of China.
THE COURT: But how is that inconsistent with the language of the principal occupying power? That perhaps the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty is recognizing a government, the Republic of China.
MS. PATTERSON: Certainly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are there any other examples, or is that sufficient?
MS. PATTERSON: I think that’s sufficient, Your Honor. Again we haven’t offered up an interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty because we don’t think it’s relevant here. What plaintiffs are arguing is that the San Francisco Peace Treaty makes the United States the principal occupying power and then they take in inferential leap to say that means that the United States is the de jure sovereign and then there’s another leap to de jure sovereignty means that they are nationalists.
THE COURT: What does that language mean though? I mean it means something.
MS. PATTERSON: The principal occupying power?
THE COURT: Yes, right.
MS. PATTERSON: I believe that refers to the fact that at the time the United States signed that treaty, it was the principal occupying power of Japan. I’m a little hesitant to offer a definitive, the United States definitive construction of that treaty because again, we just don’t think it’s relevant here. Plaintiffs are claiming that they have rights that stem not simply under that treaty, but from the fact that that treaty makes the United States the de jure sovereign over Taiwan. And the United States has made it very, very clear that whoever the de jure sovereign of Taiwan is, it is not the United States. Moreover, all of plaintiffs’ claims are based -
THE COURT: If, in fact, the treaty, that language of treaty creates the United States as the de jure sovereign, can the United States walk away from that treaty? I don’t think they can.
MS. PATTERSON: Certainly, Your Honor, I think that any questions about who the de jure sovereign is over a territory are entirely within the province of the political branches.
THE COURT: If a treaty is established that the United States is the de jure sovereign -
MS. PATTERSON: I believe that -
THE COURT: --would the Executive unilaterally change that?
MS. PATTERSON: I’m a little shaky. In my reflection of Goldwater v. Carter, but I believe that the president can -
THE COURT: Let me help you, the answer is no.
MS. PATTERSON: Okay, but so I don’t believe there’s anything in that treaty that would establish the United States as the de jure sovereign, and I think that the extent to which you need to look at that treaty here is somewhat informed by this Court’s statements about how you go about examining a political question. And this Court in the Vanquil (phonetic sp.) decision clearly and quoting Baker said you need to -
THE COURT: What’s different here is if the language of the treaty supports what counsel said. If, in fact, the language principal occupying power means that the United States is the de jure sovereign, you’re in trouble.
MS. PATTERSON: Well -
THE COURT: You’re in trouble.
MS. PATTERSON: Let me offer up the United States’ position that that is not what that treaty means. Whatever else it may mean, it does not mean that the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan and I think in resolving this question, this Court should look to perform that discriminating analysis of the particular question posed here. And the particular question posed here is not whether or not the United States is the principal occupying power, but whether or not plaintiffs are nationals of the United States and further whether or not the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan, and on both of those questions, plaintiffs’ claims fail.
THE COURT: If the United States is the de jure sovereign over Taiwan, would they be nationals?
MS. PATTERSON: Not necessarily, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, so it’s possible that those questions are actually separate.

MS. PATTERSON: Yes, Your Honor. And as we -
THE COURT: Why is that? I don’t -
MS. PATTERSON: Because national is a statutory term defined in Immigration Nationality Act.
THE COURT: America, Samoa and Swain Islands -
MS. PATTERSON: Exactly, Your Honor. And I suppose that plaintiffs are alleging that there is some non-statutory route to national status and I think that there’s a pretty solid wall of precedent all eight circuit courts to have examined whether or not you can become a national within the meaning of the Immigration Act by any non-statutory routes. They clearly said you cannot.
THE COURT: But what right -
THE COURT: Was that still true after Boumediene?
MS. PATTERSON: I -
THE COURT: I mean I think what Mr. Camp is arguing is that if de facto sovereignty is enough, then if they have a claim of de jure sovereignty, they’re actually in a stronger position.
MS. PATTERSON: I think that’s simply not true, Your Honor. All of the cases, Boumediene and the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that what they were examining there was the United States objected to degree of controller perhaps de facto sovereignty. And the Boumediene decision explicitly noted the same language that the District Court here noted from Vamiliar Brown (phonetic sp.) they declined to question the Government’s assertion that the United States was not the de jure sovereign over Guantanamo Bay, just as this Court should decline to question the Executive’s assertion that United States is not the de jure sovereign over Taiwan. So in all of the plaintiffs’ claims here rest on an assertion of de jure sovereignty. They are not asserting nor could they assert that the United States exercises any actual control over Taiwan.
THE COURT: But doesn’t that lead us to a sort of odd result that de facto sovereignty is more powerful than de jure sovereignty if that’s what exists here?
MS. PATTERSON: That may be odd, but that’s what the Supreme Court said and actually I think there’s a good reason for that, Your Honor. In the Insular Cases, or at least in the Boumediene decision discussing the Insular Cases, the court said the issue there wasn’t necessarily about the you know, de jure reach of the Constitution over a particular territory. It was what limitations in here and the United States’ actual exercise of power over people so that the constitutional limitations follow an actual exercise of power as opposed to a paper trail.
THE COURT: What rights would come to someone who couldn’t meet the statutory requirement for being a national but lived in a territory over which the United States exercises de jure sovereignty?
MS. PATTERSON: I don’t know that that question’s ever been presented because I don’t think it’s ever been explored if the United States holds simply de jure sovereignty but doesn’t exercise any actual control. I don’t know what rights we have there.

THE COURT: --but what about in de facto sovereignty, I’m just wondering other than the statutory right regarding national which you say precludes, are there any other rights that someone would have?
MS. PATTERSON: If the United States were exercising, I think your question is de facto?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. PATTERSON: Yes, I think the Insular Cases did discuss what various rights would attend the United States exercise of actual power of their objective degree or control. And the court noted that it’s a highly case specific type of analysis that depends on the United States’ particular relationship. And I think in some of those Insular Cases, the court indicated that the stronger the ties, the more the control the United States had over the area. That could change the shape of the constitutional limitations that went with the exercise of that power. So I can’t offer you up a general laundry list of rights that might go along with an exercise of de facto power.

THE COURT: So they don’t include the right to a passport.
MS. PATTERSON: I don’t think they would include the right to the passport, certainly, Your Honor. If there are no further questions from the Court, the Government will rest.
THE COURT: Actually I do have a question.
MS. PATTERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: It’s a minor point. In your red brief at 18, you quote our decision in Boumediene that quote, “The determination of sovereignty over an area is for the legislative and Executive requirements.” Do you agree with that, is that a legislative function, determination of sovereignty over an area? I would have thought that the Government’s position would be that that’s exclusively for the Executive. And the Constitution gives to the Executive the right to recognize ambassadors (indiscernible).
MS. PATTERSON: Well certainly, Article 2 is rich with delegations to the Executive Branch. To the extent that the legislative powers hold a role here, I think that they’ve clearly spoken in this case. I don’t know if every case would involve a legislative weighing in on the particular sovereignty.
THE COURT: All right. Why don’t you take two minutes.
MR. CAMP: Thank you.
THE COURT: To respond to anything the Government has said.
MR. CAMP: Yes, just very, very, briefly. I just wanted to point out that in the Boumediene case it says it is not altogether uncommon for a territory to be under the de jure sovereignty of one nation while the plenary control or practical sovereignty of another. This condition can occur when the territory is seized during war as Guantanamo was during the Spanish American War. And so, you know, we conquered Japan. Japan gave up all right, title and claim and territories including Taiwan. We are the principal occupying force, therefore and so the Boumediene case does deal with importance of de jure sovereignty and points out, of course, that the Insular Cases are still effective today. Obviously it says the century old doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter. That being that when we have sovereignty over a territory, there are guarantees to certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution. And, yes, counsel for the Government pointed out that there’s this discriminating analysis of the six Baker factors that has to be done and the District Court didn’t do that. She just sort of, you know, she didn’t-
THE COURT: --She identified two Baker factors.
MR. CAMP: But she -
THE COURT: You only need one.
MR. CAMP: Well, but I don’t think she understood and I don’t think the --I don’t think she, she clearly didn’t understand that we were not seeking a declaration of
sovereignty. We were seeking a declaration of rights under the Constitution following an interpretation of the treaty by the court. So the court just sort of stepped off on the wrong foot and then if you assume that we were seeking to have a court decide who owns Taiwan, then the political act question cases would apply and she would be right. The Government would be right, but that’s not what we’re seeking. We’re not asking the Court to decide who owns Taiwan. We’re asking the Court to determine based on the language of the treaty, what are the rights, the fundamental constitutional rights -
THE COURT: Because your argument is that the treaty makes clear that the United States is the -
MR. CAMP: Principal occupying force.
THE COURT: With that comes the power, the right to have a passport.
MR. CAMP: Correct, correct, correct. And just one -
THE COURT: And other indicia of citizenship, protection under the U.S. Constitution.
MR. CAMP: Yes, certain fundamental rights to be determined. And I just wanted to point out, if I may, just one -

THE COURT: All right.
MR. CAMP: --more minute, nevertheless, whether my clients owe permanent allegiance to the U.S. for purposes of determining whether or not they qualify as nationals is a question to be decided by federal courts. Congress in the Immigration Act does not provide any explicit guidance as to the circumstances under which a person owes permanent allegiance to the U.S. This is from a Fourth Circuit case (2006) Draggient v. Gonzalez (phonetic sp.). And there are other similar cases. It is for the courts to decide nationality and for the courts to determine permanent allegiance. And there’s nothing there that says that you have to go to the statute. I think it’s an open question.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. CAMP: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Thank you. Call the next case..

DIGITALLY SIGNED CERTIFICATE
I certify that the foregoing is a correct
transcription of the electronic sound recording of the
proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
Caroline G Gibson February 8, 2009
DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC.
Deposition Services, Inc.
6245 Executive Boulevard
Rockville, MD 20852
Tel: (301) 881-3344 Fax: (301) 881-3338
info@DepositionServices.com www.DepositionServices.com

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